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The UN's Record in Nation Building
Seth G. Jones and James Dobbins*
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has invested significant military,
political, and economic resources into operations conducted in the aftermath of
interstate wars and civil unrest. A number of recent reports have examined the
UN's performance during these operations. For example, the UN SecretaryGeneral's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change concluded in
2004 that "[i]n both the period before the outbreak of civil war and in the
transition out of war, neither the UN nor the broader international community,
including the international financial institutions, are well organized to assist
countries attempting to build peace."' The Panel on UN Peace Operations led
by Lakhdar Brahimi examined the UN's ability to conduct peace operations.
This study, generally referred to as the Brahimi report, offered a similarly frank
assessment: "The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in
order 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war'. .. . Over the last
decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it
can do no better today.",2 These conclusions indicate that the UN has faced
significant challenges in attempting to establish peace and democracy in states
transitioning out of conflict. What is less clear, however, is how UN operations
compare with efforts by other international institutions and states, including the
US.
In short, how effective has the UN been in conducting nation-building
missions? How do these missions compare with those of other actors, especially
the US? What steps should the UN take to improve its ability to conduct nation*
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building missions? We define nation-building as the use of armed force in the
aftermath of major combat to promote a transition to peace and democracy.
Other terms, such as peacebuilding, peacekeeping, or state-building capture only
elements of this paradigm. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are often employed
for less far-reaching objectives, and do not fully capture broader efforts to
rebuild security, economic, political, and other institutions after major conflict.
State-building is generally synonymous with development assistance, which is
much broader and longer-term than our definition of nation-building.3 In
addition, as William Maley correctly notes in this issue, the concept of "postconflict transition" is something of a misnomer.4 Conflicts rarely end neatly and,
as the current cases of Iraq and Afghanistan highlight, conflict can continue
during the transition period. Nevertheless, we distinguish between the major
combat phase and the transition phase that follows. This is fairly straightforward
in most cases. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, nation-building includes the
period after major combat, which began in May 2003 in Iraq and. December
2001 in Afghanistan.
Contrary to most assessments, our examination of UN nation-building
missions since World War II shows that the UN has been fairly successful in
placing post-conflict societies on the path to enduring peace and democratic
government. Most alternatives to the UN are either vastly more expensive or
considerably less capable. Critiques of the UN-including several critiques in
this issue-are generally plagued by three methodological problems. The first is
selection bias.' Most nation-building books and articles examine a single case or
small number of cases but fail to look more broadly at a range of cases.6 Single
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For a general discussion, see Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Orderin the 21st
Century (Cornell 2004); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak
States, 28 Ind Security 5, 5-43 (2004); Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations,
TransitionalAdministration,and State-Builing(Oxford 2004).
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observations can lead to indeterminate results, since they do not control for
random error and can make it impossible to determine which of several
alternative explanations is the most viable.' Second, other critiques fail to
compare the UN's experience with those of other states and international
organizations. How has the UN performed relative to other actors? Third,
others fail to offer a systematic methodology for measuring success. In this
issue, for example, Kirsti Samuels rather bluntly concludes that UN missions
have been characterized by a "lack of success." 8 But it is unclear how she defines
or measures success, how the UN compares with other states and international
organizations, and whether the cases she cites are representative. As explained in
more detail below, we examine two primary outcomes-peace and democracyand use the State Failure and Polity IV data sets for each of our cases.
Despite the UN's achievements, however, the organization continues to
exhibit weaknesses that decades of experience have yet to overcome. Most UN
missions are undermanned and under-funded. UN-led military forces are often
sized and deployed on the basis of unrealistic best-case assumptions. Troop
quality is uneven. Police and civil personnel are always of mixed competence.
And all components of UN missions tend to arrive late, with police and civil
administrators arriving even more slowly than soldiers. 9 These weaknesses limit
UN operations to those that do not require forced entry, assume at least some
measure of compliance from the various conflict parties, and need no more than
twenty thousand troops.' 0 UN operations are generally confined to countries
where there has been a peace settlement and opposing sides have largely stopped
fighting, as illustrated by the UN experience in El Salvador, Namibia, and
Mozambique. No UN nation-building operation has exceeded twenty thousand
troops. Operations that exceed one or more of these limits generally require the
US, NATO, EU, or another major power to take the lead and provide the core
military force.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section I provides a brief overview
of the UN's historical experience in nation-building. Section II examines key UN
Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Harvard 1991);
Michael Schaller, The American Occupation ofJapan: The Originsof the Cold War in Asia (Oxford 1985).
7

There are several comparative case studies of UN operations. See, for example, William J. Dutch,
ed, UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (St Martin's 1996); United
Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations PeaceKeeping, UN Doc DPI/1800, UN Sales No E.96.1.14 (1996); William J. Dutch, ed, The Evolution of
UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and ComparativeAnaysis (St Martin's 1993).

8

Kirsti Samuels, Post-ConflictPeace-Buildingand Constitution-Maki'ng 6 Chi J Intl L 663, 663 (2006).

James Dobbins, et al, The UN's Role in Nation-Building:From the Congo to Iraq ch 12 (RAND 2005);
Fearon and Laitin, 28 Intl Security at 5-43 (cited in note 3).
10 Dobbins, et al, The UN's Role in Nation-Building at 227, 250 (cited in note 9).
9
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inputs into nation-building operations, such as levels of military and police,
duration, timing of elections, and economic assistance. Section III examines
such outcomes as the ability to achieve peace and democracy. Section IV
outlines key UN reforms to improve its ability to conduct nation-building
missions. Section V concludes with implications for future UN missions.
I. A HISTORY OF UN NATION-BUILDING
This section provides a short overview of the UN's experience in nationbuilding by outlining eight cases: Congo (1960-64); Namibia (1989-90); El
Salvador (1991-96); Cambodia (1991-93); Mozambique (1992-94); Eastern
Slavonia (1995-98); Sierra Leone (1998-present); and East Timor (1999present). All of these cases fit our definition of nation-building: they involved
the use of armed force in the aftermath of major combat to promote a transition
to peace and democracy.
During the Cold War, UN troops were largely used to monitor ceasefires
and patrol disengagement zones on contested ground in areas such as Cyprus,
Palestine, and Kashmir. Their purpose was not to facilitate resolution of these
longstanding disputes and assist in reconstruction but rather the more limited
purpose of preventing the escalation of violence. However, there were two
notable exceptions. One was the 1950 Korean War, in which the defense of
South Korea was undertaken by a UN-mandated, US-led multinational coalition.
The second was the Congo, where the UN organized and led a robust nationbuilding mission beginning in 1960. The first was facilitated by an ill-conceived
Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council and the second by an unusual
conjunction of US, Soviet, and non-aligned interests in keeping Africa's
decolonization on track."
Among UN-led military operations, the Congo mission was unmatched in
size, scope, and ferocity of combat.' 2 The Congo mission remains the only
operation in which UN-led forces engaged in sustained combat, mounted a
series of set-piece offensives, and employed fixed-wing attack aircraft. In
11
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The UN assisted in at least one other decolonization case during this period. In 1962 it deployed a
small peacekeeping force to West New Guinea to facilitate the transfer of territory from Dutch to
Indonesian control. The territory had been a Dutch colony since 1828. The UN established a
temporary executive authority to administer the territory, maintain law and order, protect the
rights of the population, and supervise the buildup of a local police force. In May 1963, the UN
transferred full administrative control to Indonesia.
Dobbins, et al, The UN's Role in Nation-Building at 214-16, 225-41 (cited in note 9). For general
background on the Congo operation, see Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will. Men, Women, and
Rape 132-39 (Simon and Schuster 1975); Gordon King, The United Nations in the Congo: A Questfor
Peace (Carnegie Endowment for Intl Peace 1962); Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A United
NationsForce in Action (Brookings 1965).
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December 1961, for example, the UN launched a military operation in
Elisabethville in response to the secession of the Katanga province. The ensuing
battle involved six thousand UN and three thousand Katangan troops. UN
forces possessed mortars, artillery, and an air force provided by India, Sweden,
and Ethiopia and were thus able to conduct offensive combat operations."
Overall, UN-led units sustained more combat deaths in the Congo (135) than in
nearly all subsequent UN nation-building operations combined. 4 The UN also
lost Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjtld, whose plane went down en route to
a rendezvous with Katangan president Moise Tshombe in 1961.
Given the unprecedented nature of its mission and the consequent lack of
prior experience, existing doctrine, designated staff, or administrative structure
to underpin the operation, the UN performed fairly well in the Congo.
Significant forces began to arrive within days of the Security Council's
authorization, a performance matched in few subsequent UN peacekeeping
missions. Measured against the bottom line requirements of the international
community-that decolonization proceed, colonial and mercenary troops
depart, and that the Congo remain intact-the UN was largely successful.
Democracy did not feature heavily in the various Congo resolutions passed by
the UN Security Council. The Congo never became a functioning democracy,
but large-scale civil conflict was averted for more than a decade following the
UN's departure. The country also held together for another three decades, albeit
under a corrupt dictatorship. 5 Of at least equal importance to the Security
Council sponsors of the Congo intervention, the principle of territorial integrity
was preserved, and decolonization was able to proceed throughout the rest of
Africa. But UN achievements in the Congo came at a considerable cost in
troops lost, money spent, and controversy raised. To some critics, the UN's
apparent complicity in the apprehension and later execution of Prime Minister
Patrice Lumumba overshadowed its accomplishments. 6
As a result of these costs and controversies, neither the UN's leadership
nor its member nations were eager to repeat the experience. For the next
twenty-five years, the UN restricted its military interventions to conducting
13

George Martelli, Experiment in World Government: An Account of the United Nations Operation in the
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Congo, 1960-1964 155-61 (Johnson 1966). On the December fighting in Elisabethville, see also
Rosalyn Higgins, 3 United NationsPeacekeeping 1946-67 426-34 (Oxford 1980); Ernest W. Lefever
and Wynfred Joshua, United Nations Peacekeeping: 1960-1964 117-121 (Brookings 1966); Catherine
Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence,January 1960-December 1961 447-55 (Oxford 1965).
Dobbins, et al, The UN's Role in Nation-Building at 233 (cited in note 9). See also United Nations,
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Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type (2005), available online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/fatalities/fatal2.htm> (visited Nov 19, 2005).
Arthur M. Bullock, An Assessment of Peace Operationsin the Congo (RAND 1994).
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Brian Urquhart, The Tragedy of Lumumba, 48 NY Rev of Books 4, 4-7 (Oct 4, 2001).
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inter-positional peacekeeping, policing ceasefires, and patrolling disengagement
zones in circumstances where all parties invited its presence, and armed force
was to be used by UN troops only in self-defense.
But the end of the Cold War presented the UN with new opportunities and
new challenges. The early post-Cold War UN-led operations in Namibia,
Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique followed similar patterns. The
international community, with US and Soviet backing, first brokered a peace
accord. The Security Council then dispatched a UN force to oversee its
implementation. In each case, the responsibilities of the UN mission included
initiating an expeditious process of disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration; encouraging political reconciliation; holding democratic elections;
and overseeing the inauguration of a new national government. Operations in
each of these countries were greatly facilitated by war-weary populations, great
power support, and cooperation from neighboring countries. The UN became
adept at overseeing the disarmament and demobilization of willing parties, but it
did not have sufficient resources to successfully reintegrate former combatants
into society. 17 Economic growth accelerated in most cases, largely as a result of
the cessation of fighting. All four of these operations culminated in reasonably
free and fair elections. All four also resulted in a sustained period of peace that
endured after the UN withdrew soldiers and police. But peace, growth, and
democracy were often accompanied by an increase in common crime, as old
repressive security services were dismanded and demobilized former combatants
were left without a livelihood."
Cambodia had the least successful democratic transformation and
experienced the greatest renewal of civil strife, although not to the level that
preceded UN intervention. Indeed, -following the fall of South Vietnam in 1976,
the Khmer Rouge launched a genocidal campaign of collectivization in
Cambodia in which 1.7 million of its citizens died-over 20 percent of the
population. Following a period of border clashes between Khmer Rouge and
Vietnamese forces, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, defeated the
Khmer Rouge and, for the ensuing decade, occupied Cambodia with some

17

See, for example, UN Dept of Peacekeeping Operations, Disarmament, Demobilization, and

18

Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Prinaples and Guidelines (1999), available
online at <http://www.reblefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SD/LGEL-5SJHQ2?OpenDocument>
(visited Nov 19, 2005); Paulo S. Wrobel, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaraguaand El Salvador,
UNIDIR/97/1, UN Sales No GV.E.97.0.1 (1997); Jianwei Wang, ManagingArms in Peace Processes:
Cambodia,UNIDIR/96/17, UN Sales No GV.E.96.0.14 (1996).
See Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict 79-90, 122-28, 135-48
(Cambridge 2004); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, International Peacebuilding: A
Theoreticaland.QuantitativeAnalysis, 94 Am Pol Sci Rev 779, 779-801 (2000).
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250,000 troops.' 9 The UN's challenges in Cambodia can be attributed to the
deeper trauma that society had experienced during the decades of genocidal
conflict; the unwillingness of the Khmer Rouge and the ruling party, the
Cambodian People's Party, to live up to their commitments; the absence of
nearby democratic role models; the more limited international inputs in the form
of troops, money, and time; and the briefness of the UN intervention-less than
two years. 20
These nation-building operations were followed by missions in Eastern
Slavonia in 1996 and East Timor in 1999. The operations in Eastern Slavonia
and East Timor suggest that the UN is capable of executing a robust peace
enforcement mandate in circumstances where the scale is modest, the force
includes a core of capable troops from major powers, and the venture has strong
international backing. Eastern Slavonia was the last Serb-held area of Croatia at
the end of the Balkan wars. The UN was responsible for governing a territory in
transition, in this case from Serb to Croat control. The operation was generously
manned, well-led, abundantly resourced, and strongly supported by the major
powers, whose influence assured the cooperation of neighboring states. Not
surprisingly, given these advantages, 21the UN peace enforcement mission in

Eastern Slavonia was highly successful.

East Timor was an ideal showcase for UN capabilities. Like Eastern
Slavonia, East Timor was small in both territory and population. International
resources, in terms of military manpower and economic assistance, were
unusually abundant. Major power influence secured cooperation from
neighboring states. A multinational coalition led by Australia initially secured the
22
territory and then quickly turned the operation over to UN management.
Remaining combatants were disarmed, new security forces were established, a
local administration recreated, elections held, and a democratically-elected
19

20

21

22

For a general history of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, see Evan Gottesman, Cambodia
After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building (Yale 2003); David P. Chandler, The Tragedy
of CambodianHistory: Poliics, War and Revolution Since 1945 (Yale 1991).
See Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legay and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford 1999); Doyle, UN
Peacekeeping in Cambodia (cited in note 6); Brown and Zasloff, Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers
(cited in note 6); Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr, eds, Keeping the Peace (cited in note 6).
Interview with Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative, UN Secretary-General to
Eastern Slavonia, Washington, DC (Sept 21, 2004); Christine Coleiro, Bringing Peace to the Land of
Scorpions and Jumping Snakes: Legay of the United Nations in Eastern Slavonia and TransitionalMissions
(Canadian Peacekeeping 2002).
Alan Ryan, The Strong Lead-Nation Model in an Ad Hoc Coaltion of the Willing. Operation Stabilise in
East Timor, 9 Intl Peacekeeping 23, 23-24 (2002); Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, East Timor
and the New HumanitarianInterventionism, 77 Intl Affairs 805, 805-27 (2001); Alan Ryan, Primary
Responsibilities and Primagy Risks: Australian Defence Force Partipationin the InternationalForce East
Timor (Land Warfare Studies Centre 2000).
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government was inaugurated in 2002.23 However, the UN still faced several
challenges. International police and civil administrators were slow to arrive and
of variable quality. Once ensconced, UN administrators were somewhat slow to
turn power back to local authorities. These were minor blemishes, however, on a
generally successful operation.
Even in less benign circumstances, such weaknesses continued to threaten
the success of UN operations. In Sierra Leone, inadequate UN forces were
inserted under unduly optimistic assumptions, encountered early reverses, and
eventually suffered the ultimate humiliation of being captured and held hostage
in large numbers.24 Poised on the verge of collapse, the Sierra Leone operation
was rescued by the United Kingdom and turned around, thanks in large measure
to extraordinary personal efforts by the UN Secretary-General and the British
prime minister. British forces arrived and extricated UN hostages, intimidated
insurgent forces, and began to train a more competent local military. The US
threw its logistical and diplomatic weight behind the operation. The regime in
neighboring Liberia, highly complicit in Sierra Leone's civil war, was displaced.
Additional manpower and economic resources were secured. With British
assistance, the UN was able to oversee a process of disarmament and
demobilization and hold reasonably free elections.
II. UN INPUTS
Each nation-building mission takes place in a unique environment. But the
objectives, instruments, and techniques remain largely the same. This makes it
possible to compare across cases the level of international inputs (such as
troops, police, money, and time) and outcomes (such as peace and
democratization). While the measures available provide crude approximations of
the level of effort and results at best, this methodology does permit more than
merely impressionistic or anecdotal comparisons across case studies. Nationbuilding outcomes are naturally caused by much more than the quantity of
inputs. Success depends on the wisdom with which such resources are
employed, and the susceptibility of the society in question to the changes being
23

24

25

See Interview with Peter Galbraith, Director for Political, Constitutional, and Electoral Affairs for

UNTAET, Washington, DC (Jan 9, 2004); Michael G. Smith, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to
Independence (Lynne Rienner 2003); King's College London, A Review of Peace Operations:A Casefor
Change (King's College London 2003); Jonathan Steele, Nation Building in East Timor, 19 World
PolyJ 76, 76-88 (2002).
See Mark Malan, Phenyo Rakate, and Angela McIntyre, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL
Hits the Home Straight (Institute for Security Studies 2002); Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., Peacekeeping
Fiascos of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests (Praeger 2002).
See Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones
(Westview 2002).
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fostered. Some strategies work better than others, and some societies are more
ready to change. Nevertheless, success depends in some measure on the quantity
of international military and police forces, the duration of the mission,
organization of elections, and economic assistance committed. The data indicate
that UN operations that were well-resourced-such as East Timor and Eastern
Slavonia-were also most successful in terms of peace and democracy.
A. MILITARY AND POLICE PRESENCE
The data on UN military and police deployments show a rough correlation
between the number of soldiers and police deployed per capita and the
outcomes of peace and democracy. Those countries with more robust
deployments were more likely to be peaceful and democratic. In the immediate
aftermath of civil or inter-state wars, a period of anarchy emerges in which
groups and factions seek to arm themselves for protection.2 6 These "spoilers"2
1
can include a variety of organized criminal groups, militia, and insurgents.
Troops are critical for defeating and deterring these groups, patrolling borders,
securing roads, combating organized crime, and conducting general law
enforcement functions such as policing streets. Many of these functions are best
performed by military police and troops specially trained for urban patrols,
crowd control, civil reconstruction, and peace enforcement, such as the French
gendarmerie, Italian carabinieri,and Spanish guardiadvil.28 Total military force levels
for UN missions have ranged from nearly twenty thousand UN troops deployed
to the Congo and sixteen thousand to Cambodia, to just over four thousand in
Namibia.29
But there are significant limitations in using aggregate numbers, since they
do not control for the different sizes of the populations and economies of these
countries. Force-to-population ratios varied widely. Large numbers of UN
military forces were deployed to Eastern Slavonia and East Timor at thirty-four
and ten soldiers per one thousand inhabitants, respectively. Force levels in
Namibia and Sierra Leone were smaller at three soldiers per thousand

26

27

Barry Posen, The Securioy Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, in Michael E. Brown, ed, Ethnic Conflict and
InternationalSecuri/y103 (Princeton 1993); Doyle and Sambanis, 94 Am Pol Sci Rev at 780 (cited in
note 18).
Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Barry Weingast, The Rationaliy of Fear PoliticalOpportunism and Ethnic
Conflict, in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds, Civil Wars, Insecunriy, and Intervention 261, 261302 (Columbia 1999); Stephen Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 Intl Security 5, 5-53

(1997).
28

29

Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds, Poling the New World Disorder:
Peace Operationsand Public Securify (National Defense 1998).
Dobbins, et al, The UN's Role in Nation-Building at 227 (cited in note 9).

Winter 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

inhabitants. And those in Congo, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique had
one or fewer soldiers per thousand inhabitants.3"
International civilian police are an increasingly important component of
most UN nation-building operations, in some cases representing ten percent or
more of the overall force.31 The UN has deployed international police to help
UN military forces restore security, build and train local police forces, and
provide security for local inhabitants. In El Salvador, for example, the UN
deployed a peak of six hundred UN civilian police observers. These police
lacked arrest authority, were unarmed, and depended on the Salvadoran police to
make arrests. In contrast, the UN deployed over one thousand civilian police to
East Timor and nearly five thousand to Kosovo-all possessed arrest authority
and were required to carry sidearms. As with the figures for military presence,
the UN operations in the smaller societies of Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, and
Namibia had the largest civilian police contingents per capita at 3.1, 1.7, and 1.1
police per 1,000 inhabitants respectively. Although UN civilian police forces
usually left with the troops, in El Salvador, Haiti, and Eastern Slavonia they
stayed a year or more after the military component withdrew. The US pioneered
the use of armed international police in Haiti, but looked to the UN to supply
police for the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The US did not
include civil police in its last two nation-building operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. UN-led operations have possessed much higher ratios of police to military
soldiers. The absence of any international civil police in Afghanistan and Iraq
has increased the burden upon US and coalition military forces to handle public
security and police training functions there.32

30

For data on military forces, see Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 19441946 (Center of Military History 1975); Strength of the Army (War Department 1945); Strength of the
Army (War Dept 1946); The Militagy Balance (Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, 1991-1996, 1999,
2000, 2003, 2004); UN Dept of Peacekeeping Operations, available online at
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko> (visited Nov 19, 2005); Jane's Information Group, available
online at <http://www.janes.com> (visited Nov 19, 2005); Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom
Woodhouse, Enfclopedia of InternationalPeacekeeping Operations (ABC-CLIO 1999). Population data
online at
Database, available
International
Census Bureau
obtained
from US
<http://www.census.gov> (visited Nov 19, 2005).

31

See Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Searchfor a Postconflict
Stability Force (US Inst of Peace 2004); Robert M. Perito, The American Experience with Police in Peace
Operations(Canadian Peacekeeping 2002).

32

For police data, see The Military Balance (cited in note 30); UN Dept of Peacekeeping Operations
(cited in note 30); Jane's Information Group (cited in note 30); Ramsbotham and Woodhouse,
Engydopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations (cited in note 30); UN Dept of Public
Information, Yearbook of the United Nations, UN Sales No 1947.1.18 (1946/47); Oakley, Dziedzic,
and Goldberg, eds, Policing the New World Disorder (cited in note 28). For population data, see US
Census Bureau International Database (cited in note 30).
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B. DURATION
The data also show a rough correlation between the duration of nationbuilding missions and the outcomes of peace and democracy. Those countries
with longer nation-building missions were more likely to be peaceful and
democratic. In the early 1990s, both US-led and UN-led operations were usually
terminated quickly, often immediately following the completion of an initial
democratic election and the inauguration of a new government. The UN
remained in Namibia for one year; El Salvador for four; Cambodia for two; and
Mozambique for two. The US stayed in Somalia and Haiti for three years.3 3 In
this period, the US and the UN tended to define their objectives rather narrowly,
focusing on exit strategies and departure deadlines. As experience with nationbuilding grew, however, both the UN and the US recognized that reconciliation
and democratization could require more than a single election. By the end of the
decade, both UN-led and US-led operations became more extended and
peacekeeping forces were drawn down more slowly rather than exiting en masse
following the first national election. Examples include the UN deployments to
Sierra Leone and East Timor, which have lasted for six years and are still
ongoing.
C. TIMING OF ELECTIONS
Elections were roughly correlated with success, especially repeated
elections over time. The establishment of a democratic political system is a core
objective of most nation-building operations. Central to this process has been
the planning and conduct of democratic elections. Local elections rarely
preceded national ones. In Cambodia, the first local elections were held ten years
after the intervention-in Eastern Slavonia they were held just fifteen months
after the operation began. National elections preceded or were held at the same
time as local elections in every UN-led operation except Eastern Slavonia. The
US-led cases showed more divergence. In Japan and Bosnia, local elections were
held well after national elections. In Haiti, they were held simultaneously. In
Germany and Kosovo, local elections preceded national polls by at least eighteen
months. Initial elections were determined to be free and fair in nearly all of the
cases studied. Elections are a prerequisite for democracy, but speed in organizing
elections is not necessarily an indicator of ultimate success. Haiti, for instance,
had one of the quickest elections but never became a viable democracy. There
are other drawbacks of quick elections. In Bosnia, early elections brought to
power the most belligerent and nationalistic political parties within the Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serb communities: the Muslim Party of Democratic Action, the
33
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Croatian Democratic Union, and the Serbian Democratic Party. As American
negotiator Richard Holbrooke pointed out: "The election strengthened the very
separatists who had started the war."34 In addition, as Jack Snyder has argued,
transitions to democracy can be violent and destabilizing. Promoting
democratization and free-market economies in institutionally weak and conflictprone environments can further weaken the government.35
D. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Finally, the data show a rough correlation between the level of economic
assistance and the outcomes of peace and democracy. Those countries with
greater per capita levels of assistance were more likely to be peaceful and
democratic. External assistance on a per capita basis varied greatly among UN
cases. Eastern Slavonia received the most per capita funds at $290 per
individual-more than ten times the amount given to Cambodia at $28, Sierra
Leone at $25, and Congo at $24. Because of its proximity to Europe and the
desire to succeed after the previous five years of failure in the Balkans, European
donors were especially generous. Since the region also had a small population of
barely one hundred thousand, funds went much further on a per capita basis
than in those countries with much larger populations.36 East Timor also received
relatively high levels of assistance at $233 per capita for its comparatively small
population of 1.1 million.37 In general, small societies tended to receive more
assistance on a per capita basis than larger ones, with Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia,
East Timor, and Kosovo leading this group. Iraq, the largest of the modern
nation-building missions, has also been particularly well funded at $206 per
capita.38
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III. PEACE AND DEMOCRACY OUTCOMES

Post-conflict operations tend to be heavily scrutinized by the media,
politicians, and public. Progress toward the mission's goals is hard to measure
and defend. Yardsticks are often inadequate. The measurements for effective
security often are the amount of money spent on police and army training or the
number of police and soldiers trained, rather than the level of political violence.
Without the ability to measure performance, policymakers lack an objective
method for judging success and failure in ongoing crises. This makes it difficult
to generate mid-course corrections.
We measure nation-building outcomes by examining whether there was
sustained peace and democracy. While we believe peace and democracy are the
most immediate and critical outcomes, we recognize that most outcomes are
interconnected. As Amartya Sen has argued:
Political freedoms (in the form of free speech and elections) help to

promote economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education
and health facilities) facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities (in

the form of opportunities for participation in trade and production) can
help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social

facilities. 39
We break the cases into two categories: US-led and UN-led operations. US-led
operations are those in which the US played the lead role in using armed force.
Examples range from the US-led efforts to overthrow the governments in
Afghanistan and Iraq, to the US-led efforts during the bombing campaigns in
Bosnia and Kosovo in 1995 and 1999, respectively. UN-led operations are those
in which the UN played the lead role in using force. However, the UN has
participated in virtually all US-led operations, as have a number of other
countries, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations. The
converse is also true-the US is typically involved in UN-led missions. We now
turn to our two measures of nation-building outcomes.
First, peace is a critical outcome of nation-building. Without peace, neither
economic growth nor democratization is possible. With peace, some level of
economic growth becomes almost inevitable, and democratization is at least
possible. Definitions of peace may vary from case to case, but a peaceful
environment is one in which violence-prone groups such as insurgents or
criminals are subordinated to legitimate governmental authority, reintegrated
into society, or defeated. A peaceful environment is also one in which the
population is free from major threats to their safety, and national and
international actors are able to rebuild political, economic, and other key
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governance institutions."° To measure the level of peace, we used information
from the State Failure data set at the University of Maryland's Center for
International Development and Conflict Management. 41 Of the eight UN-led
cases, seven are at peace. Of the eight US-led cases, four are at peace and four
are not (or at least not yet). These categorizations are necessarily provisional,
particularly for the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Peace in Bosnia,
Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone has been sustained but so. far only with
the ongoing presence of international peacekeepers.
War severely disrupts the economies of not just states in conflict but also
their neighbors. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have attempted to quantify
some of the economic costs of civil war. They find that on average civil wars
reduce prospective economic output by 2.2 percent per year for the duration of
the conflict. 42 However, once peace is restored, economic activity resumes and,
in a number of cases, the economies grow. In all the cases studied, conflict
resulted in a fall in output and living standards in the societies concerned. Peace
brought economic growth in all but two cases five years after nation-building
began. High levels of external economic assistance resulted in rapid economic
recovery in Bosnia at 21.3 percent, East Timor at 7.1 percent, and Kosovo at 5.7
percent. Persistent violence and limited domestic capacity for good governance
resulted in slower rates of growth in Sierra Leone at 1.9 percent. In Mozambique
and Congo, these same factors resulted in continued falls in per capita GDP at
negative 1.7 percent and negative 0.02 percent, respectively. Countries like El
Salvador and Cambodia enjoyed strong growth despite less generous inflows of
aid.43
40
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Second, democracy is also a critical outcome. Democracies tend to be more
peaceful than other forms of government. 44 As UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan has argued: "There are many good reasons for promoting. democracy.
Not the least-in the eyes of the UN-is that, when sustained over the longterm, it is a highly effective means of preventing conflict."4 We categorized each
of the countries studied as democratic or not democratic. To code cases, we
used data from the Polity Project at the University of Maryland. 46 Among the
UN-led cases, all but the Congo and Cambodia remain democratic today.
Among the US-led cases, Germany and Japan are democratic; Bosnia and
Kosovo are democratic but still under varying degrees of international
administration; Somalia and Haiti are not democratic; and it is still too early in
Afghanistan and Iraq, though the recent elections are encouraging. Table 1
highlights the cases and outcomes.
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TABLE

UN-Led Missions

US-Led Missions

1. NATION-BUILDING OUTCOMES
Democratic in 2005

Country

Peacefulin 2005

Congo

No

No

Namibia

Yes

Yes

El Salvador

Yes

Yes

Cambodia

Yes

No

Mozambique

Yes

Yes

Eastern Slavonia

Yes

Yes

Sierra Leone*

Yes

Yes

East Timor*

Yes

Yes

West Germany

Yes

Yes

Japan

Yes

Yes

Somalia (UNITAF)

No

No

Haiti

No

No

Bosnia*

Yes

Yes

Kosovo*

Yes

Yes

Afghanistan*

No

?

Iraq*

No

?

* = Ongoing Operation
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IV. UN REFORMS
Despite the UN's achievements and experience, it still exhibits weaknesses.
Key weaknesses include a chronic shortage of personnel and money; poor
quality of troops, police, and civilian personnel; late arrival; and coordination
problems.
First, UN missions tend to be undermanned and under-funded and are
frequently staffed and led subject to the expectations of unrealistic best-case
scenarios. This is not because UN managers generally believe smaller is better
(although some may), but because member states are rarely willing to commit
the troops, police, or money any prudent military commander would desire. As a
result, small and weak UN forces are routinely deployed into what they hope, on
the basis of best-case assumptions, will prove to be post-conflict situations.
When such assumptions are ill-founded, UN forces often have to be reinforced,
withdrawn, or occasionally rescued. In Sierra Leone, inadequate UN forces were
inserted under unduly optimistic assumptions, encountered significant
challenges, and had over five hundred troops captured and held hostage by
Revolutionary United Front forces. Decisive action by the British helped revive
the mission. An elite British military task force defeated Revolutionary United
47
Front fighters near Freetown and captured the group's leader, Foday Sankoh.
Second, troop quality is uneven and has worsened as several Western
powers have followed US practice and become less willing to commit their
armed forces to UN operations. Law enforcement and civil personnel are not
uniformly competent. Even in the successful UN mission in East Timor, civilian
police officers were of mixed quality and virtually none of the international
police spoke the local language. 4' The failure of UN missions in both Somalia
and Bosnia, when contrasted with the more robust US-led multinational efforts
that succeeded them, led to a general conclusion that, although the UN might be
up to peacekeeping, peace enforcement was beyond the organization's capacity.
This conclusion, not uncongenial to the UN's own leadership, is nevertheless
belied by that organization's performance thirty years earlier in the former
Belgian Congo.
While the UN can and does engage in peace enforcement operations, there
are practical limitations on its capacity in this field. When a nation-building
operation requires a forced entry, a coalition of the willing led by a global or
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regional power is generally necessary.4 9 As international relations realists have
long noted, great powers are pivotal global and regional actors because of their
superior military and economic capabilities.5 ° These capabilities are important for
operations where forced entry is required. Core combat forces from the
Australian Defense Forces, for example, led the International Force East Timor,
and had conducted extensive training in counterinsurgency operations and the
disarmament and detention of hostile individuals and groups.5 Fully capable
countries include only a handful of militaries, such as the US, United Kingdom,
France, and Australia. While numerous developing countries have contributed
forces to UN operations, most lack the training, financial resources, and
expeditionary capabilities to act as the lead military actor. As the Brahimi report
concluded:
Some countries have provided soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no
helmets, or with helmets but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport
capability (trucks or troops carriers). Troops may be untrained in
peacekeeping operations, and in any case the various contingents in an
operation are unlikely to have trained or worked together before. Some
units may have no personnel who can speak the mission language.... This
must stop.5 2
Third, all components of the mission arrive late-police and civil
administrators arrive even more slowly than soldiers. An inevitable characteristic
of nation-building operations is the time required to deploy personnel, collect
pledges of financial assistance, and turn these pledges into actual payments.
These delays translate into on-the-ground delays in terms of employing
contractors, building facilities, or providing equipment. Having on hand a
reserve fund and stocks of appropriate equipment and supplies, along with a
framework of contracts with suppliers of critical services and infrastructures,
could mitigate these problems. Another answer lies in modifying peacetime
accounting and contracting regulations to take account of the urgent security
requirements of post-conflict situations. Even if the political commitment is
available to deploy police or judicial personnel, or the funds are available to
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deploy contractors, there is a lag in the speed with which international personnel
can be deployed. Funding, equipment, and supplies are relatively easy to arrange
ahead of time. But significant effort is necessary to identify and mobilize
professionals into post-conflict situations.
Fourth, coordination problems among donor states, international
organizations, NGOs, and host states have become an unfortunate trademark of
UN missions.5' The UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change concluded that "at the field level, many different
elements of the United Nations system and the broader international community
engage in some form of peacebuilding, but they work too slowly and without
adequate coordination. ' 5 4 Poor coordination can have serious consequences
during nation-building missions. It can weaken fragile states by scattering
assistance among an assortment of projects or by failing to sufficiently tackle key
priorities. The number of actors involved in nation-building has increased
exponentially since the end of the Cold War, making coordination more
challenging. One way to improve coordination is the careful crafting of
organizational arrangements to help overcome collective action problems.55
There are a variety of potential arrangements: a lead nation, such as the US in
Japan and Iraq; a lead international institution, such as the UN in Kosovo and
East Timor; regular host nation consultations with major donors; and a lead
nation or institution for specific sectors, such as the approach in Afghanistan.
A lead nation or institution such as the UN is usually most effective to
coordinate planning and funding, especially when the host government has little
national capacity. It can be difficult to agree on a lead actor, since donor states,
international institutions, and NGOs generally have different priorities, interests,
and strategies. But a lead actor is critical to maximize command and control,
efficiency, and effectiveness. This can include coordinating and overseeing the
undertaking of joint assessments, preparing shared strategies, coordinating
political engagement, establishing joint offices, and introducing simplified
arrangements such as common reporting and financial requirements. Crucial to
the task of establishing a lead actor is "buy-in" from the host government, and
support from key donors, international organizations, and NGOs. The creation
of a Peace Building Commission, recommended in the Secretary-General's
recent report on UN reform, should serve to strengthen coordination between
the UN and Bretton Woods systems of institutions. One of the Commission's
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primary functions is to improve coordination with such organizations as the
World Bank and IMF in the aftermath of major war by creating more efficient
institutional arrangements, information-sharing processes, and funding
mechanisms.56
In addition, there is a strong need to consolidate lessons learned and best
practices for coordination. NGOs and other organizations have worked out
effective ad hoc organizational arrangements at national and local levels to
improve coordination. One important aspect should be to coordinate with those
international institutions or non-governmental organizations that were involved
in development efforts before and during the conflict. Such experience provides
an invaluable understanding of the country and the major challenges within the
country. Since reliable statistical information on security, economic, health, and
other conditions is often unavailable during the initial post-conflict phase, prior
knowledge is crucial. Bilateral donors, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations should utilize actors with in-country experience to
assist in coordination and planning.
V. CONCLUSION
Nation-building is difficult work. Challenges encountered by the US in
Afghanistan and Iraq put earlier UN failings in some perspective. UN-led
nation-building operations have been smaller, cheaper, and, at least by our
sampling, more successful than American operations. But US-led operations
have taken place under more demanding circumstances. Experience
demonstrates that neither the US nor the UN is yet fully equipped for these
tasks, and both have much to learn. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize
that despite these shortcomings, UN-led and US-led nation-building efforts have
saved millions of lives and freed many societies from war and oppression. 57
Although the US and UN styles of nation-building are distinguishable, they
are also highly interdependent. It is rare that both are not involved. In Somalia,
for instance, a US-led coalition rescued a faltering UN-led operation, and UNled troops came to the rescue of beleaguered American soldiers. Blue-helmeted
UN troops covered the American withdrawal and remained in Somalia for
another year until finally the US Navy and Marines returned to extract the
remaining UN forces. In Haiti, UN-led missions have twice relieved US-led
intervention forces over the past decade. In Bosnia, the UN supplied the police
56
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components of a NATO-led peacekeeping mission. In Kosovo, the UN and
NATO divided responsibility for securing and governing that territory between
them. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US turned to the UN to oversee the
process of government formation and the organization of elections.
Assuming adequate consensus among Security Council members on the
purpose for any intervention, the UN provides the most suitable institutional
framework for most nation-building missions. It has a comparatively low cost
structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of
international legitimacy. Many options are likely to be too expensive, such as
coalitions led by the US, EU, or NATO. Or they are likely to be less capable
than the UN, such as coalitions led by the African Union, the Organization of
American States, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The more
expensive options are best suited to missions that require forced entry or more
than twenty thousand troops. The less capable options are suited to missions
where there is a regional, but not a global, consensus for action or where the US
simply does not care enough to foot 25 percent of the bill.
Today, both UN and US nation-building efforts stand at near historic
highs. Demand for UN-led operations far exceeds the available supply,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. US armed forces, by far the world's most
powerful, also find themselves badly overstretched by the demands of such
missions. A decade ago, nation-building became a term of opprobrium, leading a
significant segment of American opinion to reject the whole concept. Ten years
later, nation-building appears ever more clearly as a responsibility that neither
the UN nor the US can escape.
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